A Plurality of Persons in Relation: Bengtsson on Pluralism

Randall E. Auxier, Southern Illinois University Carbondale

Metaphysics and Ontology

In Jan Olof Bengtsson's The Worldview of Personalism: Origins and Early Development, the issue of pluralism in relation to personalism is a theme that arises periodically. I want to bring this topic to the table for his response, for I believe there is an important difference between the way that, on Bengtsson's account, personalists most effectively addressed the issue and the way I think it ought to be addressed. It is unclear in the text whether the solution Bengtsson offers as most satisfactory to the question of monism and pluralism also reflects his own view. From discussions with Bengtsson, I glean that indeed this solution is close to his own view. I do not dispute that most personalists have handled the issue of monism and pluralism in the way Bengtsson describes. My view is, in some ways, the inverse of the view Bengtsson seems to recommend, and so it may be instructive to compare them and seek some criteria for judging between them. My view of the way to handle the issue of pluralism is close to the solution offered by Josiah Royce, and it is markedly different from the solutions of Borden Parker Bowne and Andrew Seth Pringle-Pattison that Bengtsson seems to favor.