Frederick C. Doepke, Metropolitan
State College of Denver
Introduction
I want to defend a metaphilosophy in which the concept of a person is
central. By a "metaphilosophy" I mean a theory of the nature of philosophy.
As with other theories, the metaphilosophy is defended on the grounds
that it explains a variety of known facts. I will clarify as we go along
both how the concept of a person is made central and what are the facts
the theory is meant to explain. I begin by clarifying the nature and ambition
of this type of theory.
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