On the Negative Account of the Self

Y. Michael Barilan, Tel Aviv University/Meir Hospital

A philosopher once asked, "How do I know that when I want an apple, I really want an apple and not a pear?" Kripke interprets Wittgenstein's "private language argument" in the light of such questions and in the framework of "Wittgenstein's Paradox," indicating that the argument and the paradox dig to the roots of human communication (49). Kripke points out that Wittgenstein distinguished between mental processes in general and "genuine introspectible mental states or processes" such as pain, wishes, or moods. I wish to depart from this point and embark on a different journey, leaving behind well-trodden epistemological paths (such as subjectivity as a "special epistemic access" or the privacy, communicability, and ineffability of qualia, "radical interpretations").